



Fatality Investigation Report

Underground Coal Mine

Fatal Roof Fall Accident

May 31, 2024

Buchanan Minerals, LLC

Buchanan #1 Mine

Mine Index No. 11912AC

P.O Drawer L, Oakwood 24631

Buchanan County, Virginia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview	2	Conclusion	11
Accident Investigation	3	Enforcement Action	12
Description of Accident	5	Recommendations	13
Physical Factors	9	Appendix	14

Overview

On May 31, 2024, at approximately 4:20 PM, Brock Anthony Jackson, a 27-year-old second shift roof bolter operator, was fatally injured when he was struck by a large section of rock that fell from the roof in the area of the mine he would be working that evening; known as the No.2 right long block crosscut. Mr. Jackson was pinned between the fallen rock and the mine floor on the 16 East Development Panel. The section of fallen rock that struck Jackson measured approximately six feet long, four feet wide and approximately 14 inches thick and weighed approximately 3,500 to 4,000 lbs. Jackson traveled through an area approximately 17 feet long of unsupported roof to retrieve some bolting supplies from the roof bolter to his right. Mr. Jackson then proceeded back through the same cut. That is when the section of unsupported roof fell and struck Jackson. Jackson had 14 months of mining experience at the Buchanan #1 Mine and seven months of experience as a roof bolting operator.




Accident Investigation:

The following investigation was conducted pursuant to §45.2-556.E of the Coal Mine Safety Laws of Virginia:

The Virginia Department of Energy (Virginia Energy) Coal Mine Safety (CMS) team was notified of the accident on May 31, 2024, at 4:30 pm. An investigation team made up of Mine Safety and Health Administration Norton District representatives and CMS inspectors promptly responded to the accident. Photographs, measurements, survey mapping, and personnel interviews were conducted during the investigation. The informal interviews were held at the Buchanan #1 mine on May 31, 2024. The formal interviews were held on June 3, 2024, at the MSHA Vansant field office, with persons believed to have knowledge of the facts concerning the accident. A list of persons participating in the investigation is included in the Appendix.

General Information:

Coronado Global Resources Incorporated is the parent company of the Buchanan Minerals LLC, Buchanan #1 Mine which currently operates a large longwall operation in Southwest Virginia. The Buchanan Mine penetrates and develops coal reserves of the Pocahontas 3 Seam that averages 72 inches in total mining height and is 1,550 to 2,175 feet below local topography. The Buchanan Mine, Mine Index # 11912AC, is in the southeastern portion of Buchanan County, Virginia. In May 2024, individuals responsible for mine management included Keith Sigmon, General Mine Manager; Josh Honaker, Superintendent; Bryan



Richardson, Assistant Superintendent; Tim Laforce, Mine Foreman; Dave Lawson Second Shift Mine Foreman; Quintin Justice, Mine Engineer; and Rex Penn, Safety Supervisor. This operation typically employees 718 miners of which approximately 668 are underground workers and the remaining are surface workers. The mine complex operates seven days per week, twenty-four hours per day and includes three production shifts per day. Daily production averages between 17,000 and 20,000 tons of raw coal material. This level of production is achieved from seven miner super-sections on panel development and one retreat longwall unit. The super-section development is designed to support longwall unit production and maximize coal recovery. The longwall panels are 750 to 1,000 feet wide and average approximately 11,500 feet in length. In May 2024, the mine had thirteen ventilation shafts, three of which are used to transport miners in and out of the mine. One is adjacent to State Route 632 in the community of Mavisdale and another is located along State Route 680 on Contrary Road. The third is on Horn Mountain. The operation utilizes eight large exhausting ventilation fans that move over 2.5 million cubic feet of air per minute through the mine air courses to provide fresh air to workers underground and carry away mine gases. In 2024, atmospheric monitoring indicated the mine produces approximately 3.8 million cubic feet of methane per day through the mine fans. Through designed longwall panel degassing and planned coalbed methane wells from the surface, coal operations work diligently to flush and capture coalbed methane ahead of underground panel development and longwall retreat. Controlled subsidence from longwall mining creates natural fractures for coalbed methane removal from the “gob” areas. Gob wells (or vertical degasification boreholes) assist in controlling the mine atmosphere throughout the longwall district and prevent excess accumulation of methane gas throughout the underground air courses.

Description of the Accident:

On May 31st, 2024, the second shift coal production crew of nine men entered the Buchanan mine at approximately 3:00 PM. They traveled to the 16 east development panel where they arrived on the section at approximately 3:45 PM. The second shift section mine foreman, Greg Reynolds, waited at the section's power center, which is located in the No.3 entry with the belt and track, to meet with dayshift section mine foreman, Brad Coleman, to briefly discuss conditions on the section.

Greg Reynolds proceeded to break 43 where he met with the section crew to hold a safety meeting. Reynolds discussed staying focused on their job duties and conditions on the section. After the meeting the miners split up and traveled to their assigned equipment to start production. Brock Jackson (victim) and Brandon Dotson (co-worker) were assigned to operate the Fletcher roof bolter on the left side of the section. They walked to the No.2 intake entry to the left side of the Fletcher roof bolter to put their dinner buckets on the roof bolter located in the No.2 left crosscut.

Both operators then traveled across to the left miner in the No.2 right crosscut to evaluate conditions left by the dayshift crew and prepare to install roof support. According to witness interviews, Brock Jackson had a discussion with Brandon Dotson while standing in front of the miner stating that he did not want to travel back down the No.2 intake entry outby the section survey number (41282) to look in the supply hole to see if there were any cable bolts.

The miner operator, Rocky Lester, then arrived at the miner and saw Brock Jackson and Brandon Dotson standing in front of the miner. This is when Jackson traveled through the area of approximately 17.1ft long of unsupported roof to go to the right-side Fletcher roof bolter to retrieve two cable bolts off that machine.

When Jackson arrived at the right-side roof bolter, both operators of the right-side roof bolter told him there were no cable bolts on the bolter. Brock then proceeded back to the No. 2 right cut through (scrap cut) and as he proceeded to travel back through the unsupported area, Rocky Lester (miner operator) and the co-worker, Brandon Dotson, both tried to warn Jackson several times to not come back through the cut through because small rocks were falling from the roof and they heard several popping noises that indicated it was going to fall any time.

Jackson still proceeded through the crosscut. He traveled approximately 11 feet when the rock fell from the mine roof measuring approximately 6' long x 4' wide x 14" thick and weighing approximately 3,500 to 4,000 pounds. The rock struck Mr. Jackson pushing him to the mine floor and landed on top of him causing blunt force injuries to his torso. A

toxicology report would later reveal the presence of fentanyl in Jackson's system.

At approximately 4:15 PM, Rocky Lester (miner operator) went for assistance and contacted the section foreman, Greg Reynolds, to notify him of the accident. The section foreman proceeded to the scene of the accident and directed the other miners to retrieve first aid equipment.

Justin Vest arrived on scene with jacks and that is when the section foreman left the scene to call Hassle Caudill (assistant dayshift mine foreman) for assistance and to inform him that they needed advanced medical assistance. The section foreman then proceeded back to the scene to take the oxygen administration bottle so rescuers could administer oxygen to Jackson.

By this time Jason Roberts (EMT) had arrived on the section. Roberts directed the section foreman to call outside and request a helicopter. Jackson was still under the rock. When the section foreman arrived back at the scene, Jason Roberts (EMT) and Justin Vest (section electrician) had removed Jackson from beneath the fallen rock and were administering CPR and First Aid. The rescuers then applied the AED to the victim and the AED advised to give shock to the victim. The rescuers proceeded to load the victim on a coal hauler and brought him out of the No.2 crosscut and down the No. 2 intake entry to move him to a personnel carrier to travel toward the surface of the mine. They met more advanced medical help at the bottom of the 9-vent hoist at approximately 5:25 PM. Brock and the rescuers arrived on the surface around 6:00 PM and he was transported to Clinch Valley Medical Center in Richlands, Virginia.

Geological Conditions:

There was over mining approximately 1,350 feet above that had been conducted in the Jawbone seam by Chad Coal No. 4 mine in 1992 to 2002. There was no under mining conducted at this mine. The overburden at the accident scene was approximately 1,940 feet. An analysis of pillar stability for longwall mining was conducted using the Analysis of Coal Pillar Stability (ACPS) program provided by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The values exceeded the NIOSH recommended pillar stability factors of safety. The mine roof skin generally consisted of competent shale strata with some slicken sided materials present. Where slicken sided surfaces were observed, draw rock had been mined or had fallen as the coal was mined. There were several areas on the section with low angle slips that had fallen during the mining operations. The roof strata consist of sandstone/sandy shale with shale streaks at random depths. All observed areas had 16" x 16" roof caps installed in conjunction with the 6" x 16" bearing plates on the 72'

fully grouted tension rebar used as primary support. Two cable roof bolts are installed in the right and left approach to the intersection in the No.3 entry for the belt and track width as required in the Approved Roof Control Plan.

Roof Control Plan

Safety Precautions in the Roof Control Plan:

Page six of the approved roof control plan addresses the safety precautions to take when mining at the Buchanan Minerals #1 Mine:

C. Warning devices-red reflective ribbons that are readily visible or physical barriers shall be conspicuously placed to warn persons approaching any area which is not permanently supported upon the completion of the loading cycle.

D. Training- all personnel required to install roof supports shall be instructed by a qualified person designated by mine management before being assigned to perform such work. All new miners shall have training in the hazards of mine roof and rib and have the contents of this plan explained to them before they begin work. A copy of the approved Roof Control Plan shall be available to workers at the mine.

E. Working faces shall be permanently supported on the next regularly scheduled bolting cycle after the working face is exposed. When circumstances delay the installation of permanent support, the condition will be corrected and roof supports installed during the next regularly scheduled bolting cycle.

F. Unsupported roof- No person shall work or travel under unsupported roof except to install temporary supports. Before any person proceeds inby (direction of the working face) permanently supported roof to install temporary supports, a thorough visual examination of the unsupported roof and ribs shall be made. If the visual examination does not disclose any hazardous condition, persons proceeding inby permanent supports shall test the roof by the sound and vibration method, if conditions permit, as they advance into the area. When installing supports in the face area, workers shall be within five (5) feet of a temporary or permanent support. If hazardous conditions are detected, corrective action shall be taken to give adequate protection to workers in the area. Statements from mine personnel indicated it was a normal practice to take down or scale down loose material with the proper size bar. Page 8., Paragraph O. states how to scale down loose material:

O. Scaling loose material is to be done with, a minimum of two temporary supports on a maximum of five feet centers installed between workers and the material being taken down unless such work can be done from an area adequately supported by permanent roof supports.

The roof control plan was revised to address additional safety support measures. The revision was approved on July 1,2024, and included the following:

Warning devices- hanging red reflective items (two or more) that are readily visible or physical barriers shall be conspicuously placed to warn persons approaching any area which is not permanently supported upon the completion of the loading cycle. (red reflective items include reflective ribbon or rods (i.e. plastic pipe) with reflective material extending at least 14 inches from the roof – physical barriers are placed rib to rib and can include but not be limited to standing roof mesh materials, or a double row of chain installed with red reflective material) Warning devices shall be in place at all times except during roof bolting procedures.

Unsupported roof- No person shall work or travel under an unsupported roof except to install temporary supports. Before any person proceeds inby permanently supported roof to install temporary supports, a thorough visual examination of the unsupported roof and ribs shall be made. If the visual examination does not disclose any hazardous condition, persons proceeding inby permanent supports shall test the roof by the sound and vibration method, if conditions permit, as they advance into the area. If hazardous conditions are detected, corrective action shall be taken to give adequate protection to workers in the area. Temporary supports will be set no further than a person can safely reach while their body remains under supported roof (e.g. a maximum of two feet). Temporary support will be installed under the direct supervision of a certified foreman, except in an emergency, the absence of a certified foreman will not hinder the rescue and recovery of a person.

Emergency cache of supplemental roof support material maintained on the section emergency sled shall consist of at least:

1. 20 – 6X6 inch square posts 10 feet in length or equivalent support material of suitable length – (quick set jacks, timbers, or other metal floor to roof supports may be alternatives)
2. 50 – wedges
3. 80 Ton lifting capacity with a minimum of two lifting devices
4. 1 – Slate bar
5. 1 – Hammer or axe
6. 2 – Hand saws

Section personnel will be informed of the cache location after each time it is moved. Examinations of the emergency cache on each section will be conducted as part of a pre-shift examination. Physical barriers (physical barriers are placed rib to rib and can include but not be limited to standing roof mesh materials, or a double row of chain installed with red reflective material) shall be conspicuously placed in each approach a person can enter the intersection to warn persons approaching an unsupported intersection prior to being holed through. The devices or barriers shall be placed outby the intersection with at least one row of permanent roof support between the projected intersection and barriers. This will also be done in the entry that the continuous miner is cutting if the section is to be idle or equipment left alone (not if controls handed to next shift – “hot seat”).

Mine Examination Records

The May 31, 2024, pre-shift mine examination report was called out by the Dayshift mine Foreman Brad Coleman and was reviewed. The time of the examination was from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. and the report taken by second shift foreman Greg Reynolds. There were no hazards recorded during the pre-shift examination. During the On-shift examination the following conditions were reported:

Location	Condition	Action Taken
1		
2		
3	Loose Rock	Pulled
4		

Physical Factors / Other Factors:

The accident investigation revealed the following:

1. The time of the accident was estimated to be approximately 4:15 p.m. The accident occurred in the No. 2 entry right crosscut on the 16 east development section. Jackson was observed traveling through a 17 feet area of unsupported roof twice. A section of roof material fell striking the victim and entrapping him to the mine floor during the second pass.

2. The toxicology report results showed positive results for fentanayl and para/meta flourofentanayl (an illicit fentanyl analogue with no prescription source). Despropionyl fentanyl (also present) is a commom precursor used in fentanyl production and is also a minor metabolite.

3. There were two eyewitnesses to the accident. According to their statements, Jackson was observed traveling through and then returning through the same area of unsupported roof in the No. 2 crosscut. The roof material broke after it separated and fell from the mine roof in the cut through of the crosscut. The section of fallen roof material that struck Jackson measured approximately 72 inches long, 48 inches wide, and 14 inches thick. The fallen roof material broke into two sections. The estimated weight of the section of fallen roof that entrapped Jackson was approximately 3,500 lbs. to 4,000 lbs. Smaller sections of broken roof material surrounded the larger section of the roof fall on the mine floor. The distance of the unsupported top of the crosscut measured approximately 17.1 feet in length.

4. Jackson's cap light, glove, and bandana were located on the mine floor near the victim's body.

5. The height three rows outby the accident scene measured 84 inches. The three rows outby Mr. Jackson's location was 20 feet.

6. The left continuous Joy Miner was in the No.2 right crosscut at the accident scene. The continuous miner was approximately 33 feet from the last row of permanent support.

7. The battery powered coal hauler used to haul the victim from the accident scene was parked in the No. 2 entry intersection supply hole. Two long handle slate bars (pry bars) and an eight-foot torque tension bolt was also located near the accident scene.

8. The mine floor condition at the accident scene in the No. 2 right crosscut was dry and unlevel with few apparent floor irregularities. The roof conditions through the crosscut contained several irregularities.

9. Jackson's position was estimated to be approximately 72 inches from the last row of permanent support in the No. 2 right crosscut when the roof material fell. Jackson was entrapped when a large section of roof material fell, which was positioned on top of Jackson. Jackson was trapped in a face down position in the direction of the No. 2 entry with his left arm and shoulder free from fallen rock.

10. The mine utilizes AMR tracking and mine atmospheric monitoring systems. The AMR system consists of an underground network of fixed Communication Nodes and leaky feeder cables that communicate with mobile devices worn by the employees, called Miner Communicators, to transmit two-way data between the surface and underground. The AMR system provides tracking and communications that includes breadcrumb tracking and direction of travel. Information is updated every 30 seconds.

11. The data log of the AMR communication/tracking system provided during the May 31, 2024, evening shift on the 16 East section was reviewed. The tracking system indicated Jackson traveled underground to the bottom of 9 Vent at 2:58 p.m. and arrived at the 16-east section at break 43 where the safety meeting was held at 3:55pm. It showed Jackson then traveled up the No.2 entry at break 43 refuge chamber to report to his assigned roof bolting machine at 4:10pm for that shift. This information correlates with interview statements from eyewitnesses.

12. Interview Statement from Brandon Dotson

During formal interviews, Brandon Dotson (roof bolter) stated that after arriving on the working section and attending the safety meeting, he and Jackson proceeded to the left side bolter. Next, they walked to the No.2 right entry that was currently unbolted to see

what they would need to do. Once they realized they would need cable bolts, Jackson told Dotson that he did not want to walk down the long block to get them and, according to Dotson, he ran through the break. Dotson spoke with the miner machine operator Rocky Lester after and informed him Jackson ran through the break. Shortly after, Dotson stated he saw Jackson's light shining toward him from across the unbolted area, so he walked over closer to the break and yelled to Jackson that it was dripping and warned him to not run through the break again. Jackson proceeded to run through the break and the rock fell.

13. Interview Statement from Rocky Lester

During formal interviews, Rocky Lester (miner operator) stated that following the safety meeting on the section, the roof bolter operators, Jackson and Dotson, had went to the work area before him. When he arrived at the miner machine Jackson and Dotson were at the break that had been cut through and Jackson had gone through the break that was down to "check the other pinner for a bolt or something". When he started to come back through, Lester stated little chips of rock were falling and he started flagging Dotson using his cap light. Lester said both he and Dotson were yelling, "don't come through there it's going to fall"., According to Lester, Jackson darted through there anyway and didn't make it. Dotson yelled for him to go get help and he said he took off and started gathering everyone he could find.

14. A review of the company's training records indicated that Jackson's training was current. Jackson received the General Coal Miner Underground certification on December 12, 2017 and Gas Detection certification on December 9, 2017.

15. The Pre-shift and On-shift mine examinations records were reviewed, and the records were complete. There were no hazards noted in the Pre-shift report for the day of 5-31-24. The On-shift report showed that the day shift foreman had pulled rock in the No. 3 entry on May 31, 2024.

Conclusion:

On May 31, 2024, at approximately 4:15 p.m., Brock Anthony Jackson, a roof bolter operator, was fatally injured when he was entrapped against the mine floor by a section of fallen rock from a section of an unsupported mine roof. Based on interview statements, Mr. Jackson traveled through a section of unsupported roof two times to retrieve cable bolts from the Fletcher roof bolter located to the right of his working area. The fatal injuries sustained by Mr. Jackson were the result of blunt force trauma to his torso.

Enforcement Action:

The investigation resulted in the following enforcement actions: Order of Closure No. SDC0017223 was issued under §45-2.569. A. (ii), of the Coal Mine Safety Laws of Virginia to preserve the scene of the accident on the 16 east development section pending investigation. The order was modified again allowing the operator to ventilate the area of the section, maintain water pumps, charge the section scoop. The survey crew was also allowed to take measurements of the accident scene and to conduct required exams on the section.

This closure order was modified again to allow necessary equipment to be used only for cleanup and installation of roof supports through the incident area at crosscut 46 for the 16 East Development panel. The mine will do the following before cleaning and supporting the area:

- Install 6 cable bolts (12' minimum) in the intersection of the #2 entry
- Install 6 cable bolts (12' minimum) in the intersection of the #3 entry
- Install 2 cable bolts (12' minimum) in the crosscut between #2 and #3 entries after every third row of permanent support
- 12 ft test hole will be drilled 10 – 15ft from the unsupported area in the crosscut
- Virginia Energy will be notified approximately two hours before bolting in the unsupported area begins. If the right-side roof bolter is unable to enter the #3 intersection safely, the intersection bolts for the #3 entry intersection will be installed after the area has been cleaned and supported. The supplemental cable bolts (two every third row) will be installed through the entirety of the crosscut.

Notice of Violation No. SDC0017299 was issued under §45.2-710.C of the Coal Mine Safety Laws of Virginia for not following the approved roof control plan and for not having the correct emergency supplies in the cache (the emergency cache did not contain a hammer or Axe, 50 wedges and two hand saws).

Notice of Violation No. SDC0017301 was issued under §45.2-820.A of the Coal Mine Safety Laws of Virginia for not following the emergency response plan and having the correct emergency supplies in the emergency injury trauma supply sled (When examined the chains were not provided on the emergency sled).

Recommendations:

1. All miners will receive retraining concerning potential hazards associated with unsupported mine roof and workplace examinations.
2. Employees will never travel out from unsupported top except to set temporary support.
3. Employees should make frequent and thorough roof and rib examinations.
4. Adequately support or scale down any loose roof or rib material from a safe location. Use a bar of suitable length and design when taking down loose roof or ribs.
5. Employees should be always aware of their surroundings and be alert to potential hazards when working or traveling near unsupported areas.
6. Areas of close clearance between the ribs and equipment should be avoided.
7. Employees should always remain alert to changing conditions and report any abnormal roof or rib conditions to mine management.


APPENDIX

ACCIDENT SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS/SKETCH	14
VICTIM DATA SHEET	18
MINE LICENSE INFORMATION	19
PERSONS PRESENT DURING THE INVESTIGATION .	20
SIGNATURE SHEET	22



**Fatal Roof Fall-Accident May 31,2024
Buchanan Minerals LLC, Virginia
Buchanan No. 1 Mine,
Mine Index 11912AC**

**Figure-1 View of No.2 crosscut entry
Accident Scene**




**Fatal Roof Fall-Accident May 31,2024
Buchanan Minerals LLC, Virginia
Buchanan No. 1 Mine,
Mine Index 11912AC**

**Figure-2 View of No.3 crosscut entry
Accident Scene**

**Fatal Roof Fall-Accident May 31,2024
Buchanan Minerals LLC, Virginia
Buchanan No. 1 Mine,
Mine Index 11912AC**




**Figure-4 View of No.2 crosscut entry
Accident Scene**




**Location of the Victim
Accident Scene**

**Fatal Roof Fall-Accident May 31,2024
Buchanan Minerals LLC, Virginia
Buchanan No. 1 Mine,
Mine Index 11912AC**

**Figure-4 View of No.2 crosscut entry
Accident Scene**





VICTIM DATA SHEET

Name: Brock Anthony Jackson

Occupation: Roof Bolter Operator

Mailing Address: 1125 College Estates Road Cedar Bluff, VA, 24609

Date of Birth: 09/24/96

Married: No (one dependent)

Total Mining Experience: 3 Years

Experience with Present Company: 7 Months

Employment at Present Occupation: 7 Months

Certification History: General Coal Miner Underground Gas Detection

MINE LICENSE INFORMATION

Official Corporation: Coronado Global Resources Incorporated LLC

Official Business Name of Operator: Buchanan Minerals LLC, Buchanan # 1 Mine,
Virginia

Person with Overall Responsibility: Josh Honaker, Superintendent

Person in Charge of Health and Safety: Josh Honaker, Superintendent

The following mine personnel provided information and/or were present during the accident investigation:

Buchanan Minerals, LLC – Buchanan #1 Mine

Brian Richardson	Assistant Superintendent
Quinten Justice	Mine Engineer
Rex Penn	Safety Representative
Dave Lawson	Second Shift Foreman
Greg Reynolds	Second Shift Section Foreman
Tim Laforce	Day Shift Mine Foreman
Josh Honaker	Mine Superintendent
Aaron Price	Corporate Safety Manager
Barry Baker	Fire Prevention

Personnel Interviewed During the Accident Investigation

Chris Justus	Faceman Hauler/ Scoop	Evening Shift
David Vance	Faceman Hauler/ Scoop	Evening Shift
Justin Vest	Electrician	Evening Shift
Ellis Shortridge	Bolter Operator	Evening Shift
Nick Gibson	Bolter Operator	Evening Shift
Rocky Lester	Miner Operator	Evening Shift
Jason Roberts	6 North Miner Operator/EMT	Evening Shift
Brandon Dotson	Bolter Operator	Evening Shift

Virginia Department of Energy

M. Randy Moore	Chief, Coal Mine Safety
Chris Whitt	Emergency Response Coordinator/ Coal Mine Safety Inspector Supervisor
Sidney Crabtree	Coal Mine Safety Inspector
Will Altizer	Coal Mine Safety Inspector
Don Rife	Coal Mine Safety Roof Control Specialist
Rusty Ward	Coal Mine Safety Inspector, Family Liaison
Mike Willis	Assistant Chief/ Engineering Manager

Mine Safety and Health Administration


Brian Dotson	District Manager (Enforcement)
Lloyd Robinette	Assistant District Manager (Enforcement)
Paul E. Smith	Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Gary Hall	Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist (Roof Control)
Chris Cain	Mine Safety and Health Specialist (Roof Control)
Mark Tuggle	Mine Safety and Health Specialist (Roof Control)
Fred Martin	Educational Field Services
Mike Colley	Mine Safety and Health (Accident Coordinator)
Bob Clay	Mine Safety and Health (Family Liaison)
Megan Ray	Mine Safety and Health (Office Assistant)
Dave Steffey	Assistant District Manager (Technical)

Family Representative

Shea Cook	Family Representative Attorney
-----------	--------------------------------

SIGNATURE SHEET


This report is hereby submitted by Sidney Crabtree and approved by Marshall Randy Moore:



10/4/2024

Sidney Crabtree, Inspector

Date



10/4/2024

M. Randy Moore, Chief

Date